Introduction
The question how national -or how territorialized -politics, and more particularly party politics are, has attracted increasing scholarly interest in recent years. The subject has a particular importance because territorially based parties might "demand distinctive treatment for that region, at levels from the co-operative sharing of powers by federalism up to and including 'national' independence." (Rose/Urwin 1975: 46) . Party nationalisation is high if party support is equally distributed across the territory of a country. Hence, a political party that is perfectly nationalised would be equally strong in all territorial units of a country, no matter how they are drawn.
1 Usually, for the measure of party nationalisation, we will rely on territorial units that are defined through administrative boundaries, such as provinces, districts, municipalities, neighbourhoods, or even streets.
Differences might occur at different levels of aggregation, thus between provinces, or within provinces, between municipalities, and so on. The nationalisation of the party system as a whole is an aggregated measure for the territorial homogeneity of support of all the parties included in the sys-1 See Stokes (1967) , Claggett et al. (1984) , Jones and Mainwaring (2003) , Caramani (2004) , or Ishiyama (2002) .
Related terminologies describe, sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly the idea of looking at heterogeneity across electoral districts, speaking of party aggregation (Chhibber/Kollman 2004; Allik 2006) , district heterogeneity (Morgenstern/Potthoff 2005) , or cross-district linkage/party-linkage across districts (Cox 1999 (Cox , 1997 Hicken 2005; Moenius/Kasuya: 2004) , referring to the idea that locally based candidates (mainly in single-seat district systems, cf. Cox 1997: 181) join national political parties.
tem. This article discusses problems of measurement of party nationalisation and provides a new indicator that avoids possible biases.
Quantitative comparative studies rely on valid indicators to measure empirical reality. Measuring party nationalisation appears to be a particularly delicate issue. In my understanding, the concept of party nationalisation addresses the territorial heterogeneity of party support. Therefore, measures of party nationalisation should only vary as a function of the territorial variance of the votes and be influenced as little as possible by other, external factors. Measures of party nationalisation calculate an indicator of territorial heterogeneity for electoral results of political parties over territorial units (such as regions, municipalities, or electoral districts). Many simple measures appear useful for the comparison of territorial heterogeneity of electoral support for parties of similar sizes, and if electoral results are aggregated in a similar number of similarly-sized territorial units. However, in most cross-country studies, parties will vary in size, and our data will be aggregated in a different number of differently-sized territorial units. This article shows that previous indices of party nationalisation might be affected by the number and size of political parties and by territorial units.
For instance, in the case of the Hungarian 1998 elections (single-seat district part), if the nationalisation of the party system is calculated at the level of 20 regions, the score shows a rather high value of 0.87. Exactly the same electoral results, aggregated at the level of 176 electoral districts, would result however in a score of 0.723, which seems low compared to most other countries of the region. Hence, results heavily depend on the data which are used for a comparison, and the number of territorial units. This might be a problem for certain research designs. Eyecatching examples for this problem are studies that are interested in the impact of electoral systems on party nationalisation (Cox/Knoll 2003; Nikolenyi 2008) . Most available datasets on the territorial structure of electoral results are aggregated at the level of electoral districts. Henceforth, common measures of party nationalisation do not allow us to investigate whether the number of electoral districts affects party nationalisation, because the number of territorial units, on which the measures rely, affect the measures. For this reason, scores are only comparable when they rely on (roughly) the same number of units. Careful examination of the properties of measures of party nationalisation is needed, in order to show which measures are useful for certain research questions.
As will be shown, many research questions require a standardisation, in order to avoid biases.
My new standardised party nationalisation score, which relies on a transformation of the Gini coefficient on inequalities in distribution, takes account of varying number and size of territorial units. Tests on electoral data from Central and Eastern Europe show that it is more reliable than previous measures, if party nationalisation should be measured across differently sized electoral units. 2 Before developing and testing my own measure of party nationalisation, I provide a systematic overview of previous measures, and explain potential problems related to them.
Previous measures of party nationalisation
Measures of party nationalisation basically investigate the diversity of party systems across territorial units. Four families of statistical indicators have been used to describe party nationalisation:
frequencies, variances, distribution measures, and inflation measures. In this section, I describe the development of indicators previously used to measure party nationalisation, and relate them to a number of possible biases which might impede comparability (see table 1 for an overview). The first scholars that measured party nationalisation used competition indices. Especially in electoral systems with small constituencies, certain parties do not compete nationwide, but only in some districts. To capture this, Rose and Urwin (1975: 19 et seq.) counted the number of uncontested seats, almost identical to Cornford's (1970) number of safe seats, counting the number of constituencies in which a party has no competitors. This has been extended to the territorial coverage index (Caramani 2004: 61) , measuring the percentage of territorial units where a political party runs in elections.
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These measures are easy to calculate and to understand. Where applications address the supply side of the electoral market -the offer of parties to voters -they capture the problem best. However, the understanding of party nationalisation remains rather rudimentary: Measuring the share of contested districts gives little information about regional heterogeneity of party support (first problem).
Parties with a very regionally based electorate, but many candidates or own lists in most electoral districts, would appear to be highly nationalised, even if the regional support of its voters would 2 A program, running under Microsoft Excel, which allows the user to calculate the standardised party nationalisation score, along with a few other indices of party nationalisation, is available from the webpage of the author. 3 Caramani (2004: 60-3 ) provides a detailed description of previous party nationalisation measures; some of the information in this section is taken from this book. Stokes (1965) shows measures that allow comparison of the importance of different territorial levels (national, regional, municipal) for inter-election volatility. However, those measures concern the development of electoral support and are not suited to measuring the territorial homogeneity of the electoral support of political parties in a given election. Morgenstern (2004: 124-5) proposes a measure of "concentration of legislators" -measuring how regionally spread the deputes of a certain party are. The measure might be adjusted for the number of districts and the number of seats a party wins. 4 The index might be adjusted so that it controls for the different size of the territorial units, measured either by the number of seats accorded to each unit, the number of inhabitants in a territorial unit, or the number of voters (or entitled voters). In this way, the real territorial coverage would be measured. Further, the measure can easily be expanded into one for party systems, through a weighted mean (weighted by the vote share) over all the parties. Caramani (2004: 61) uses a non-weighted average, overstating the importance of small local parties.
prove this not to be the case. In electoral systems with a single national constituency, frequency indices would by default indicate values of 100% for all parties.
b) Indices of variance (variation of the district results)
A second family of indicators is based on the variance in the vote share of political parties across territorial units. The index of variation developed by Rose and Urwin (1975: 28) is the mean absolute deviation of regional electoral results from the national ones, in analogy to the Rae index of disproportionality (Rae 1967) . The Lee index (Lee 1988 ) is a very similar measure, dividing the summed deviation by 2 instead of by the number of territorial units. 5 The mean squared deviation, or the standard deviation of the vote from the regional mean (Rose/Urwin 1975: 24) , weights for the magnitude of deviations. 6 These indices are familiar to measures of deviation from proportionality. 7 They can also be computed for single territorial units, comparing them to the national mean.
The second to fifth problems can be discussed related to this group of indices: The second problem concerns the fact that these indices lack upper limits, which has been criticised in the literature (Caramani 2004: 62) . Indices that vary in a standardised range are more intelligible.
Third, the index does not consider whether all territorial units within a country are equally large. In many countries, certain units are larger than others. In many empirical cases, not all of the territorial units have the same size; some of the units are much larger than others. Deviances from an even distribution of votes across the country emerge stronger if they occur in an area with small territorial units than in areas with large territorial units. Hence, the measures reflect to some extent the administrative structure, rather than the territorial structure of the vote. Reforms of administrative units would thus strongly and systematically affect the values of party nationalisation, depending on the question whether they particularly target regions where a political party is strong or weak, or if the most substantial reforms occur in regions where the electoral strength is close to the national mean. (For a more extensive discussion, see below.) 8 Further, if party nationalisation measures do not consider the differences in the size of territorial units within a country, they lead to a potential paradox: One desirable property of variance measures is that they 5 Index cited in Hearl et al. (1996: 169) . 6 The formula for the Lee index looks similar to the Loosemore/Hanby (1971) 'index of distortion' measuring disproportionality, whereas the formula for the standard deviation of the vote from the regional mean looks similar to Gallagher's (1991) index of deviation from proportionality. However, the two concepts should not be confused. Whereas the Loosemore-Hanby-index and the Gallagher index compare shares that sum up to 1 (vote shares of parties compared to the seat share of the same parties), an addition of the elements is not equal to 1 in the case of the Lee index and the standard deviation. The Loosemore-Hanby and the Gallagher indices are rather comparable to the cumulative regional inequality measure, see below.
7 In the context of elections, such indicators are used for instance to measure deviations of seats distributions from vote distributions, malapportionment of electoral districts, vote-splitting or inter-election volatility (see Taagepera/Grofman 2003; Monroe 1994) . 8 Jusko (2008) weighs for district size, so that this problem is accounted for.
would indicate increase, as we move votes from a weak stronghold to a more pronounced stronghold of a political party. However, if variance measures do not take into account the size of territorial units, then, moving votes from a unit where the party is stronger than in the national mean to a unit where its electoral strength is even, higher might wrongly indicate lower variance, provided that the second unit is the larger one.
The fourth problem that afflicts these indices regards party size, or the problem of scale invariance.
Parties with a small vote share by nature have smaller deviations than large parties. (Other terminologies speak of 'constant relative inequality aversion ', Monroe 1994: 133) . This problem can be illustrated if we imagine that a large party splits into two exactly equal successor parties, each of them taking half of the votes in each of the territorial units. At a given vote share, the variance of each of the successor parties is cut in half. Thus, for exactly the same pattern of vote distribution, smaller parties have smaller variances than large parties.
As Caramani (2004: 64-66) points out, all the measures of party nationalisation are empirically either positively or negatively correlated to party sizes. We should, however, distinguish empirical correlations from measurement induced biases. Empirically, small parties often rely for their support on local strongholds, and their strength is more heterogeneous. An unbiased measure should thus, when applied to empirical data, typically show more heterogeneity for small parties than for large parties. On the other hand, the absolute variation of vote shares among territorial units is often larger for large parties, solely on the grounds that for larger values variances are usually larger, as shown in the example of the party split. The mathematical concept of scale invariance appears thus as the only relevant one to the construction of nationalisation measures; or in other words, indicators should assure that if a party is split in half, the measured values stay the same.
And fifth, all of the measures which do not weight the deviations -thus all except for the standard deviation measure -contain the problem of "insensitivity to transfers" (Smithson 1982: 261; Monroe 1994: 139; Firebaugh 2003: 79-80) . In certain situations, when votes are transferred from a district where a party is weaker to a district where the party is relatively stronger, the (nonweighted) indices are not affected, even if such transfers increase heterogeneity.
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All four problems occur frequently among measures of territorial hetereogeneity, and are related to some other indicators too (see table 1 for an overview).
9 In a fictitious country with four equal-size regions, and a party winning the same amount of votes in two regions, while not competing in the two others, its index of variation score would amount to 0.25 (distribution of the party's national vote on the 4 regions: 50% -50% -0% -0%). If its votes would be distributed unequally on the two regions (for instance: 75% -25% -0% -0%), the index of variation would still amount to 0.5, even if such a vote distribution is much less equal (cf. Atkinson 1970: 254) . Similar, the Lee index, the cumulative regional inequality index, and the index adjusted for party size and number of regions would not be affected by the transfer. This criterion is discussed as "Dalton's principle of transfers" (Taagepera/Shugart 1989: 263) .
A number of standardisations have been proposed to tackle the problem of party size or scale invariance. Ersson et al. (1985: 175-6 ) employed the standardised and weighted variability coefficient, dividing the variance by the mean of the parties' vote share. Their measure has been criticised due to its lack of an upper limit (Jones/Mainwaring 2003) , and because it is biased by the sample size in several regards (see Smithson 1982 for one aspect of the problem, and the discussion below).
The index adjusted for party size and number of regions divides the Lee index by the average vote share in the territorial units (Caramani 2004: 62) . The cumulative regional inequality measure takes into account the influences of electoral units' size differences on the degree of homogeneity. It considers whether the distribution of a party's total national vote on sub-national regions corresponds with the population (voter) share of those regions of the national population (Rose/Urwin 1975: 30) .
Still, these measures are insensitive to transfers; the index adjusted for party size and number of regions also does not take into account different-sized territorial units.
c) Distribution coefficients (Gini coefficients)
The Gini coefficient of inequality is usually used to measure unequal wealth distribution among the population (Gini 1921) . Jones and Mainwaring (2003) use it in analogy to measure the uneven distribution of vote shares across territorial units, taking the complement of the Gini coefficient.
The regional issue dimensions indicator suffers from the scale invariance problem (see above), and the two measures based on the Gini coefficient do not take differences in district sizes into account The sixth problem concerns the level of aggregation of the electoral data. Generally, if a whole is divided into a larger number of units (lower level of aggregation), and these units are characterised, more fine-grained differences among these units emerge than if the whole is divided into fewer units (higher aggregation). Party nationalisation might be calculated from electoral results from fine-grained units, such as precincts or municipalities. If aggregating these units in larger units, such as provinces, the within-province variation is omitted, and only the across-province variation accounted for. This might be (exceptionally) equal, or (mostly) lower than variance across lower units of aggregation. Henceforth, our indicators are affected by the level of aggregation of the electoral data. This might be a problem of comparability across countries (or within countries, across time), if we were to compare data that is based on a different number of territorial units.
d) Inflation measures (difference between the size of the regional and the national party system)
One class of measures is suited for party system as wholes, but not for single parties. The inflation measures compare the number of parties at the national and at the local level. Chhibber and Kollman's (1998: 331) indicator of party aggregation subtracts the average of the effective number of parties at the district level from the same number at the national level. Whereas the indicator might be useful for single-seat district systems, it has its limits for PR systems, when in each district many parties compete. Cox's (1999: 155-6 ) inflation score considers this problem and measures the relative difference in numbers of parties between the district and the national level. 10 The index of party aggregation (Allik 2006 ) is the complement of the inflation score, so that 1 stands for high party aggregation, and low values signify low party aggregation. The inflation index (Moenius/Kasuya 2004) considers the different size of constituencies.
Inflation measures require slightly less information than other party nationalisation measures. If we had access to the electoral results by districts and overall results at the national level, but were not able to identify the parties correctly and to link the regional results to the national ones, inflation measures could still be calculated. However, inflation measures are not fully reliable, because in certain situations they suggest wrong interpretations. Given that inflation measures have been increasingly used and suggested in the literature, and that there is a general lack of a substantive critique of these measures, the following paragraph demonstrates the errors that might occur.
The problems of inflation measures and a further development
The basic idea behind inflation measures is that a territorially heterogeneous party system usually has fewer parties at the local level than at the national level. At the district level, there is Duvergerian two-party-competition, but due to inter-regional differences, substantially more than two parties compete in the national parliament (examples in Chhibber/Kollman 2004). Inflation measures are based on the difference in the number of parties at the local and at the national level, assuming that the number of parties at the local level is smaller than at the aggregated national level. This assumption leads to the seventh problem to be discussed, the bias through large local party systems.
Local party systems might in some districts be larger than the national one. This typically occurs in urban areas, whereas in rural areas some parties are dominant and thus party system fractionalisation is lower. This is illustrated by the Albanian 2005 elections. 11 Overall, the Albanian party system (vote shares in the 2005 single-seat district elections) counts 2.84 effective parties nationwide (thick line in figure 1 ). In large parts of the country, the two major parties (Democratic party, Socialist Party) have a very dominant position, which is reflected in a number of effective parties just above two (see data points in figure 1 ). In the Central costal area around Fier and some further districts, however, the third political force (Socialist Movement for Integration) and some 10 In analogy to the index of relative reduction in the number of parties proposed to measure disproportionality (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 273) . 11 Data: single-seat district part of the 2005 Albanian elections, fractionalisation of the votes, as taken from my database. Similar examples can be found in PR systems, for instance the Macedonian elections in 2006 could be used to show the same bias. Generally, the problem occurs when some parties compete nationally, and in one part of the country, one or several regional parties are added to these. Data taken from Bochsler (2008) .
smaller parties gained a substantial vote share, reflected in a larger number of parties around three, above the national average. Thus, there are data points from districts both above and below the number of parties at the national level. When one takes the average of the number of parties in the districts, the more fractionalised districts compensate partly for the small party system fractionalisation in other districts. Due to this mutual compensation, the average district party system, 2.64 effective parties, is very close to the national average, despite the widely varying party system from district to district. All the above mentioned inflation measures, however, would use the average regional party system size in order to calculate party nationalisation, and come to a fairly low difference between the regional and the national party system of just 0.20 parties 12 -and underestimate the substantial differences between district party systems and the national one.
xxx Figure 1 about here xxx Despite these reservations, inflation measures may still be useful, because they are less demanding regarding the quality of data. A slight modification of the indicators of this family of measures would allow for more robust results. I propose a measure which is based on the difference between the national party system and each regional party system, instead of the difference between the national party system and an average regional party system (formulae are reported in the appendix). Kasuya and Moenius (2008) propose an alternative version of a party inflation measure: they add two new dimensions to their concept. They still take the difference between the average party system size at the district level and the national party system (party inflation) into account, but besides this, they now also include the variance and kurtosis between districts. This new measure appears much more reliable than their previous one. However, their indicator remains an indirect measure of territorial heterogeneity. In some cases, the new dimensions correct biases of the 12 The Cox measure would result in 7.06%, and Allik's measure would report high party aggregation of 0.929 (all calculations are my own). 13 However, there might still be reservations about using the effective number of parties to calculate regional heterogeneity. Would it be possible maybe to construct an example, where the effective number of parties is equal at the national level and in each territorial unit, despite each of the parties having different vote shares from region to region? previous measure, but the correction might also happen to distort the results, so that new problems emerge (see example in appendix C). It remains questionable if any measure that is based on the effective number of parties in districts instead of party votes might lead to satisfying results. Adding to this, all indicators of this type are only applicable for party systems, and not for single parties.
Which measure is the most suited one? Table 1 provides an overview over indicators and their shortcomings. Not all the shortcomings are of the same seriousness and type. Whereas some might be just more difficult to understand (cf. lack of upper limit), others cast the applicability of the indicator into question (wrong results). And finally, the characteristic of indicators taking high values for small parties is reported as a problembut, as will be argued below, it reflects instead the empirical reality that small parties are often less nationalised than large ones. Further, the best indicator is not necessarily the one with the smallest number of problems. It matters more, what it is applied for, and whether problems are resolvable.
xxx Table 1 
about here xxx
The Gini coefficient to measure regional heterogeneity Of the indicators described above, the ones which have the lowest number of problems are the cumulative regional inequality index, the party nationalisation score, the standardised and weighted variability coefficient, or the modified indicator of party aggregation. What counts more than a purely mechanical count of the shortcomings of these indicators is the question of which of the shortcomings might easily be fixed, or which of the indicators has the best potential to be developed. I choose the complement of the Gini coefficient, or the so-called party nationalisation score, as basis for further consideration. It is better known than the other indices used, and is based on a powerful measure of heterogeneity in distributions. Below, I describe how the Gini indicator is constructed, before standardising it for both aspects which have been detected as problematic.
The Gini coefficient is a measure for inequalities across the units which are most frequently used to quantify heterogeneity in the distribution of wealth within a society (Jones/Mainwaring 2003: 142) .
It has also been proposed as a measure of the disproportionality of electoral outcomes (Taagepera/ Shugart 1989: 263) . The Gini coefficient can easily be converted into a measure for heterogeneity of the territorial vote distribution of a political party. In the case of a homogeneous distribution (high party nationalisation), every territorial unit will cast a number of votes for this political party which is approximately proportional to the unit's size, or the party will win a similar vote share in every territorial unit. In the case of heterogeneous vote distributions, however, most of the votes are concentrated in a few territorial units.
The calculation of the Gini coefficient can be explained geometrically (see figure 2 below). The territorial units are drawn on the x-axis, ranked by their support share for party P, starting with the unit where party P gets its lowest share of the votes. The y-axis describes the cumulative function of votes across regions: thus for the first unit it just shows the number of votes a party P scores in the first unit (with the lowest vote share). For the second unit, the votes scored in the second unit are added to the first, and so on. At the last unit, the y-axis shows the sum of votes scored in all territorial units, thus the total number of votes party P scored in the whole country. From this, a convex line results. In the case of low party nationalisation, the area between the graph and the perfect homogeneity line (connecting the origin and the upper right angle) is large. With higher degrees of party nationalisation (homogeneous vote distribution), the graph approximates the perfect homogeneity line, and the area becomes smaller. The Gini coefficient is actually calculated as the area between the graph and the perfect homogeneity line. In the case of perfect homogeneity (perfect party nationalisation), this area is equal to 0, whereas in the case of extremely unequal distributions it is equal to 1. Jones and Mainwaring (2003) subtract this value from 1, because they do not intend to measure inequality, but rather equality or homogeneity, called party nationalisation.
When party nationalisation is to be calculated for a whole party system (instead of single parties), the score is calculated first for each single party, and then the results are weighted by the number of voters per party in the system. PNS = 1 -Gi = ∑ (1-Gi (P)) p N = 1 -∑ (Gi (P)) p N Developments on the party nationalisation score: the impact of the size of territorial units For my standardised measure, I tackle two aspects differently from the score of Jones and Mainwaring (2003) . Both regard the size of territorial units, on which the calculation of party nationalisation scores is based. Different from previous measures, I take varying sizes of territorial units within countries and across countries into account. On the one hand, I weight exceptional voting behaviour more when it occurs in units with a large population than when it occurs in units with a small population. On the other hand, I take into account that all measures will find more variance across small units of aggregation than across few larger units. Hence, I control for the number of units on which the calculation relies.
Correcting for unequal sizes of units in a country
First, I take into account the share of each territorial unit out of the total number of votes in the country.
14 In analogy to Firebaugh (2003: 126- (Firebaugh 1999 (Firebaugh , 2003 Sala-i-Martin 2002) . Typically, one might rely on the geographic area, or on the population. Given that electoral representation today is widely understood as a reflection of the will of the population, 16 I use it as a baseline for the weighting of territorial units.
14 Given the focus of party nationalisation studies on electoral behaviour, I consider it to be relevant to consider the importance of territorial units based on their electoral importance, rather than the size of the territory, or other possible measures that might be used for weighting purposes. 15 Certainly, the electoral competition is closely linked to and shaped by administrative units, and occasionally, administrative boundaries are even drawn intentionally to affect the electoral competition (gerrymandering, malapportionment, etc.). My indicator aims at measuring, to the extent possible, the territorial heterogeneity of party support regardless of administrative units, in order to provide a measure that can be employed in research designs for which we need to measure party nationalisation in a way where the measure itself is not biased by the administrative structure of the territory. 16 Relying on the concept that the vote of each citizen should count equally, regardless of the density of population of the area where she lives in.
Measures that weight territorial units are not sensitive to territorial reforms, such as the split or the merger of territorial units. And, the relevance of the size of units is underlined by the fact that administrative units are often much more populated in urban areas than in rural areas. For instance, in Russia 50% of the counting circles count just 19% of the population. Latvian electoral statistics (for the 2002 elections) count thirty-four counties, but the largest one, the capital, Riga, counts not less than 28% of the countrywide voters, the same number of voters as in the eighteen smallest, often rural, districts combined.
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For the calculation of the weighted Gini coefficient, the cumulative vote function can be modified.
Instead of just taking the number of units on the x-axis, I draw the cumulative number of voters by unit (see figure 2) . The resulting party nationalisation score with weighted units is a first step towards my standardised party nationalisation score. It allows the comparison of parties in a country with unequally large electoral units. In the case of perfect homogeneity (perfect party nationalisation), the score would take the value 1.
In the case of extreme heterogeneity (very weak party nationalisation, the score would be close to zero. 18 The following formula establishes the party nationalisation score with weighted units would get a very high nationalisation score of 0.97 -despite being completely un-represented in more than a fourth of the country. Another fictitious party that did not get votes in just one of the smallest of the counties where only 1% of the voters live might get the same score. Indeed, the Green and Farmers Union scores very poorly in urban and in industrial areas; yet its party nationalisation score amounts to 0.798. This is almost the same value as for New Era -0.791, a party that gets considerably fewer than average votes in some smaller counties in Latvia's Eastern Latgale region -but has a rather homogeneous distribution of the votes in the rest of Latvia. However, this fails to take into account that the capital, Riga, with its 28% of the voters counts as just one county -whereas Latgale's eight counties include only 16% of Latvia's voters. Indeed, the New Era party seems to have much more homo¬geneous support throughout the country than the Green and Farmers Union. But regional boun¬daries are drawn in such a way that they report the same heterogeneity in both cases in the same way. 18 The Gini coefficient can never become exactly 1 -and similarly, the party nationalisation score can never exactly reach the lower limit of 0. This would only be the case if all the votes of a party were concentrated on one tiny point of the whole country -a point that would have to be so small that there were no inhabitants (or voters). However, this unit would be too small for the party to win votes there…
Correcting for the unequal number of units across countries
Secondly, my standardised party nationalisation score considers the number of territorial units in a country, on which it is calculated. This standardisation corrects, to the extent possible, the effect of granularity of territorial data. Generally, if variance is calculated among the characteristics of n unequal parts of a territory, then variance will increase, as the number of parts n, in which the territory is divided, increases. "Generally, statisticians expect that the lower the number of territorial units the less variation across them because of the larger size of units and the elimination -through aggregation -of extreme and outlying values" (Caramani 2004: 64) . Compared to data from many small units, in a few larger territorial units, electoral strongholds will not be any more as pronounced, and not necessarily as recognisable. The larger territorial units are, the more withinunit differences in party support will not be considered by the calculation. Many extreme patterns in party support, which are only visible in fine-grained electoral data, disappear in larger units. For comparisons of party nationalisation across countries, this is a major problem. Often, regional electoral data is reported for electoral districts, administrative regions, or municipalities. In some cases, only data from very large units exists, overall less than ten units per country. In other cases, the data are fine-grained from hundreds or thousands of electoral or counting districts. Data is 19 See as well Zucco (2007: 311) : "With fewer and larger districts, there is less variation of vote shares across them, and more importantly, much less room for the effects of this variation to be felt." In terms of general functions of distributions, we can relate the problem to the "population symmetry" problem pointed out by Monroe: after stating a superficially appealing principle, "if two distributions, each with the same mean and with the same inequality value, are combined, the index value for the combined population should be the same as it was for the groups separately" (1994: 134). Monroe shows that a distribution [0; 100] is more unequal than [0; 0; 100; 100]: in the second case, "neither the whole of the good nor the whole of its absence is held by a single individual". In analogy, it might be shown that if the number of units doubles, and single values of the distribution are redoubled (the party nationalisation index would stay the same), but the inequalities would decrease.
comparable only across datasets with the same number of territorial units. 20 Since it is usually not possible to get datasets with a comparable number of units, I define a standard number of territorial units, and estimate party nationalisation at this level of granularity.
If there were a single territorial unit, the measured party nationalisation score would be 1. With an increasing number of units, party nationalisation decreases. The exact shape of this decreasing function is unknown and might vary across countries and parties within countries. Some parties are decidedly regional, but dominate in all municipalities of their regions. These are particular cases that get a low party nationalisation score if a few units are taken into account, so that they get all their votes only in one unit (or a small part of the units). If later we should find data that allow us to measure electoral strength at the municipal or even sub-municipal level, instead of the regional level, we would get almost the same values for such parties. The contrary would be the case for parties that are represented quite homogeneously throughout all regions, but have important strongholds in some neighbourhoods or municipalities. In such cases, measured party nationalisation is high as long as the calculation is based on regions. Variance (low party nationalisation) can only be seen if data is highly disaggregated (by municipalities or voting circles). No function can precisely capture all the different imaginable patterns of vote distribution and aggregation effects. For certain parties or countries we might find strong electoral differences across regions, while in other cases, electoral behaviour across regions is similar, but varies across municipalities or neighbourhoods.
The exact pattern would require us to have exact data for several levels of aggregation, but usually, electoral data is only available for one level of aggregation. This is why we need to make certain assumptions about a typical pattern of variation of party nationalisation when measured at several instances.
Currently, the common implicit assumption that users of party nationalisation measures need to make (as a lack of other measures) is that the level of aggregation (the number of units) has no effect on their results. This is so implausible that we might call the assumption misleading: it would require that there is no within-unit variation within the units where party nationalisation is measured. Any different assumption might fit certain data more, others less, but still, it might possibly in the whole give a good picture and help to construct a useful standardisation. I assume that an increase in the number of units should lead to a steady increase in the heterogeneity that we observe. If we imagine n provinces, and each of them is further divided into n municipalities (so that in total there are n 2 municipalities), then variation among the n provinces should be similar to variation among the n municipalities in each of these provinces. I assume that heterogeneity measured at the lower level, PNS(n 2 ), corresponds to the squared heterogeneity measured at the 
Due to the assumptions I have made, that party nationalisation is a phenomenon that decreases steadily with every increase in the number of territorial units, my formula will provide less reliable estimations under particular circumstances. Amongst these might be a political ethnic conflict which is present in between regions, but where party support inside these regions is territorially very homogeneous. I expect my formula to provide good estimations in the absence of such extreme cases, if the measured parties are not too small, and if electoral data is disaggregated in a sufficiently large number of territorial units. Ten territorial units seem to be a usually sufficiently good basis, but an even larger number might be advantageous.
Certainly, other ways of standardisation might be more appropriate for different conceptualisations of party nationalisation. For instance, instead of taking a fixed number of units per country, the cross-country comparison of diversity might rely on territorial units of a fixed size, for instance comparing units of 100.000 inhabitants. The larger a country, the larger the number of territorial units it would be divided in. 21 Such a measure would measure diversity across a territory, regardless of country borders, asking how large the territory is where are voting homogeneously, where a regional political party is present, or where a regional party system exists. It queries thus the perspective about the absolute spread of party support.
Instead, my concept addresses the relative spread of party support within a polity. Starting from the territory of a country (or another given polity), it asks (at the party system level) how many different regional party systems exist, or how many territorial splits exist in a countries' party politics, or how homogeneously are the votes of a political party spread within a country.
Testing the "standardised party nationalisation score" on Central and Eastern
European data
In order to test if the standardised party nationalisation score solves the problem of granularity . 22 Those multiple data sets allow a controlled experiment using the party nationalisation measure. Since the data refer to exactly the same elections and the same vote distribution, the only aspect that varies is the number of territorial units taken into account. These are ideal laboratory data for my examination of the standardised score.
I calculated two scores for each of the twenty-eight elections. Thus, for each election, both score at the lower level (for instance municipalities) and at the upper level (for instance electoral districts).
Ideally, between indicators that are calculated with the larger data set (lower level, more units) and 21 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 22 Electoral data on the lower level of aggregation for the Polish 1991 Polish , 1993 Polish , and 1997 elections was kindly provided by Tomasz Zarycki. Data on the lower level for the Estonian 2007 elections was taken from a database by Sikk and Bochsler (2008) .
with the smaller data set (upper level, less units), only random, non-systematic differences should remain. This should lead to a substantial reduction of the differences between both levels (apart from cases where the territorial differences between party strongholds and areas with weaker support strictly follow the boundaries between territorial units at the upper level).
Without standardising, the results of the party nationalisation score range from 0.54 to 0.91, within a variation of 40%. For each pair of data, the score is on the average 12.2% higher if calculated at the upper level of aggregation (table 2) The huge difference between the lower and the upper level is eliminated to a high degree through the standardisation (table 2) . For the Hungarian elections of 1998, the two values vary only by 3.4%
after standardisation (instead of 21%). In 25 out of 28 analysed elections, the standardised score proves to be more reliable than the non standardised one. The systematic deviation was reduced for the dataset under study by more than seven times, from 12.2% to -1.7% (means over all 28 elections).
xxx Table 2 countries with important ethno-cultural divisions that follow (partly) the administrative regions or electoral districts. Then, moving from few territorial units to more fine-grained data from a lower level will report only slightly more heterogeneity, so that our standardisation might overdo. This will be even worse, when our data is aggregated in very few units, as in the case of Slovakia with only four units at the upper level in 1992. In Slovenia, however, with eight electoral districts, the standardisation seems already accurate.
However, these are limits that will occur in every attempt to account for the bias of the number of units: if data are aggregated differently, we never measure exactly the same. I can only provide a solution that is accurate for most, but not for all cases. My measure eliminates the largest part of the bias that is contained in non-standardised measures, and that leads on the whole to reasonably similar results for different levels of aggregation.
Conclusions
There is a growing interest in the study and quantification of party nationalisation, defined as the homogeneity of the electoral strength of a political party across the territory. To measure party nationalisation, one relies on electoral results from territorial units, such as provinces, municipalities, or precincts. In this study, I show that measures of territorial homogeneity are strongly influenced by the number of territorial units that are taken into account for their calculation.
Accordingly the administrative division of a country might heavily affect the results of cross- with more than ten territorial units should be favoured, since the standardised party nationalisation score might be biased for a small number of units.
23 In most of the cases, access to sub-national data might be difficult and expensive, and there might not be more than one accessible level of data. Where feasible, I use data at the lowest level of aggregation or the largest number of territorial units, since these data reflect party nationalisation at the most precise degree. This implies as well including a lower level (for instance counting circles) if an upper level of administrative units (for instance electoral districts or provinces) seems more relevant. The latter argument however reflects the question whether territorial boundaries between political parties and administrative borders are congruent or crosscutting. It might be argued that we should only measure the differences of party systems across relevant political units. The latter however is not exactly the same variable as party nationalisation as it is used in this study. Party nationalisation is here defined as the territorial homogeneity of party support, and is not related to administrative borders (and is thus different from approaches which interact territorial heterogeneity with the question if it is congruent with administrative units). Mean squared deviation
Standardised and weighted variability coefficient (Ersson et al. 1985: 176; Smithson 1982: 262 
Index adjusted for party size and number of regions (Caramani 2004: 313) 
Cumulative regional inequality (Rose/Urwin 1975: 30 Three-dimensional measure see Kasuya/Moenius (2008) Table 4 shows a fictitious example that illustrates a possible bias of the measure by Kasuya and Moenius (2008) . The white fields show a party system with four districts and four political parties.
It has a standardised party nationalisation score of 0.56, or measured with Kasuya/Moenius' of 6.9.
In a second example, I add a fifth district where voters clearly vote differently than in districts 1-4.
Party A, which was the largest in districts 1-4, again gets the largest vote share in district 5. Parties B, C, and D do not exist in the fifth district, and instead, two new parties E and F run only in the fifth district. The addition of the fifth district increases the territorial heterogeneity for parties B to F (and slightly affects the heterogeneity of the vote for party A). For this reason, measures of party nationalisation should report more territorial heterogeneity for the example with five districts, compared to the four-district situation. Accordingly, my standardised party nationalisation score drops from 0.56 to 0.51, which means that heterogeneity increases. For the Kasuya-Moenius measure, however, the contrary is the case. Every indicator should report an increase in heterogeneity, but instead, the Kasuya-Moenius index drops from 6.9 to 6.4 (which means that heterogeneity decreases). This occurs because their measure relies on a multiplication of three dimensions:
inflation (between the effective number of parties at the district level and the national level), variance (between the districts) and kurtosis (between the districts). In my example, the addition of a fifth district increases inflation (from 37.5 to 49.0), but at the same time, variance and kurtosis strongly decrease (from 0.46 to 0.41 / from 3.5 to 1.7), so that overall, the index decreases. This illustrates a bias of the Kasuya-Moenius index, which relies on the fact that its three dimensions are only indirectly linked to the territorial heterogeneity of the party system. In most cases, each dimension somehow corrects for problems by other dimensions, but this correction is not always accurate. Table 4 : Fictitious country with four districts and four parties (white area), and with five districts and six parties (whole   table) . Votes by party and effective number of parties per district.
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